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Abstract This paper shows that, for symmetric games in normal form, strat-
egy profiles that satisfy Hofstadter’s Superrationality criterion also satisfy both
of Halpern’s and Pass’s criteria under Common Counterfactual Belief of Ra-
tionality: minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality.
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1 Introduction
Most of the equilibrium concepts in game theory are Nash equilibria (Nash,
1951). This is because most of them are defined under the assumption that an
agent considers the opponent’s strategy to be counterfactually independent of
their own strategy. In the case of two players playing a game in normal form,
this means that, for example, the row player will hold a column for fixed, and
pick the row that provides the best payoff in that column.
Over the last few decades though, there has been a few results that investi-
gate what happens if this assumption does not hold, in other words, for agents
that consider that, if they picked a different strategy, the opponent would
also pick a different strategy. This is similar to the idea behind the Stackel-
berg equilibrium (von Stackelberg, 1934) where the reaction of the opponent
is anticipated and taken into account in the reasoning, but without the time
dimension.
The idea of counterfactuals is not new and dates back to 1968 and 1973
with Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973). In the same period,
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Robert Nozick (1969), and then Martin Gardner (1973) published Newcomb’s
problem, which materializes the concept of predicting the actions of a free,
rational agent to the actual contents of an opaque box, and points out that
a careful distinction between causal relationships and counterfactual depen-
dences is paramount. The two-boxer resolution of Newcomb’s problem is in
agreement with the Nash paradigm—the choice of an agent is independent
from the past—while the one-boxer resolution would correspond to the alter-
nate, non-Nashian paradigm on which this paper focuses.
Douglas Hofstadter (1983) defined the concept of superrational players in
a symmetric game such as the prisoner’s dilemma. The idea is that a super-
rational player playing against another superrational player will consider that
both will pick the same strategy, include this knowledge in her reasoning, and
only reason on the diagonal of the normal-form matrix. In other words, a su-
perrational player considers that her actions and the opponent’s actions are
counterfactually interdependent. As a consequence, the equilibrium reached
will not (always) be a Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, after Douglas Hofs-
tadter submitted his 20-way prisoner’s dilemma challenge to his colleagues,
Martin Gardner compared it to Newcomb’s paradox in his explanations, but
eventually chose to defect rather than cooperate, “with a sign of regret.”
Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1992) showed a strong relationship between New-
comb’s paradox and the prisoner’s dilemma, confirming Martin Gardner’s in-
tuition, and, conjectured (Dupuy, 2000) that it should be possible to define an
equilibrium concept for extensive form games that would implement the idea
of counterfactual dependence between an agent’s action and its prediction.
Such an equilibrium would have an underlying notion of preemption to solve
Grandfather’s paradoxes that necessarily arise in the presence of a timeline,
leading players to follow a Kantian imperative to avoid such paradoxes. It was
proved in 2004 that this equilibrium exists, is unique and is Pareto optimal.
The equilibrium and proofs were made public in 2014 as the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium (PPE) (Fourny et al, 2014).
An alternate course of research for counterfactual reasoning for games in
extensive form is pursued by Richard Shiffrin et al (2009). Shiffrin’s approach
mainly differs from the PPE in that it disagrees on the relevance of preemption,
and as such does not permanently discard outcomes deemed irrational in the
middle of the reasoning.
Wolpert and Benford (2013) formally established that both accounts of
Newcomb’s problem (one-boxer reasoning, two-boxer reasoning) can be ex-
plained with two different modelling of conditional probability distributions
(incompatible Bayes nets), and as such, that both resolutions are acceptable.
Based on the work of David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker, Halpern and Pass
(2013) defined the counterpart of Rationalizability for games in normal form
in which players assume that their strategies are counterfactually interdepen-
dent, which they call Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR).
Halpern and Pass define two criteria that strategy profiles can satisfy under
the CCBR assumption: minimax rationalizability and individual rationality.
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1 2
A u1(A, 1), u2(A, 1) u1(A, 2), u2(A, 2)
B u1(B, 1), u2(B, 1) u1(B, 2), u2(B, 2)
Fig. 1 A game in normal form, with two players that each can pick two strategies (A and
B for the row player, 1 and 2 for the column player)
In this paper, we establish that, in the case of symmetric strategic games,
superrational strategy profiles—we call them Hofstadter equilibria—satisfy
both minimax rationalizability and individual rationality. In other words, the
work of Joseph Halpern subsumes (is a superset of) Douglas Hofstadter’s Su-
perrationality. This formally establishes a link between CCBR and Superra-
tionality.
2 Background on non-Nashian game theory
Before we come to this result, we give some background on games in normal
form, Nash equilibria, Superrationality and CCBR.
2.1 Games in normal form
In game theory, games are typically expressed in two forms: normal form and
extensive form. In extensive form, the game is expressed as a tree. At each
node, a player picks a child node, and the leaves describe possible outcomes and
are labelled with payoffs. On the other hand, in normal form, time plays no role
and the payoffs are organized in a matrix—or a tensor of higher dimensionality
than two if there are more than two players. Figure 1 shows a two-player game
in normal form. One player plays on the row, the other plays on the columns.
Definition 1 (Game in normal form)
A game in normal form is defined with:
– a finite set of players P .
– a set of strategies Σi for each player i ∈ P .
– a specification of payoffs ui(
−→σ ) for each player i ∈ P and strategy profile−→σ = (σj)j∈P .
The payoff space only needs to be totally ordered (preference relation). In
particular, when numbers are used, they are only meant as ordinals. In other
words, comparing 1 to 1000 is no different than comparing 1 to 2.
Very often, given a player i, we denote as Σ−i the cartesian product of
the remaining strategy spaces, and given a strategy profile −→σ , we denote as
σ−i the projection of the profile on Σ−i. This very conveniently allows writing
ui(
−→σ ) as ui(σi, σ−i) with a slight abuse of notation that is always clear from
the context.
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 2 The prisoner’s dilemma. A player can either cooperate or defect. If both cooperate,
they get more than if both defect. However, a player who unilaterally defects will get even
more payoff than with mutual cooperation.
Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 3 The chicken game. A player can either stay straight or swerve. If both swerve, they
get more (aka lose less) than if they both stay straight, and a player who unilaterally goes
straight gets more payoff than if both swerve. The difference with the prisoner’s dilemma,
however, is that the ”betrayed” player has interest in not reciprocating the betrayal (0 and
1 are swapped)
Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 4 The coordination game. In this game, the players have a mutual interest to pick
the same strategy, even though one of the two strategies is better for both of them (aligned
interest)
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show three famous examples of symmetric games. The
payoffs have been normalized to the first natural numbers as cardinality is
irrelevant.
2.2 Nash equilibria
Nash equilibria are defined having in mind that players hold their opponent’s
choices of strategies as fixed. The definition of a Nash equilibrium naturally
arises as a strategy profile −→σ for which, for each player, the picked strategy
σi is the best response to the other players’ strategies σ−i.
Formally:
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium) Given a game (P,Σ, u), a strategy profile−→σ is a Nash equilibrium if, for any player i ∈ P :
∀τi ∈ Σi, ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ ui(τi, σ−i)
Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the Nash equilibria for our example games.
In contrast to the above Nash paradigm, the essence of Non-Nashian Game
Theory, common to much of the work mentioned in this paper (Hofstadter,
Fourny, Dupuy, Reiche, Shiffrin, Halpern, Pass), is that strategies are not
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 5 The prisoner’s dilemma. In the Nash equilibrium, both players defect.
Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 6 The chicken game. It has two Nash equilibria: when players make opposite decisions.
Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 7 The coordination game. All diagonal outcomes are Nash equilibria, i.e., players will
not deviate if they made the same decision.
optimized given a fixed opponent strategy, but the opponent strategy is rather
assumed to be correlated to the strategy of the player at hand.
2.3 Symmetric games
There is a subclass of games that is of particular relevance, because players
are interchangeable: symmetric games.
In a symmetric game, the strategy spaces are identical for all players, and
the payoffs are defined in such a way that the game is invariant through a
permutation of players.
Definition 3 (symmetric game) A game is symmetric if
– the strategy spaces are identical
∀i, j ∈ P,Σi = Σj = Υ
– the payoffs are symmetric
∀pi ∈ Sym(P ),∀σ ∈ Σ, ui(σ) = upi(i)(σpi(.))
where Sym(P ) is the permutation group on P and σpi(.) denotes (σpi(1),
σpi(2), ..., σpi(|P |)).
All games shown on Figures 5, 6 and 7 are symmetric.
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2.4 Superrationality
Superrationality was introduced by Douglas Hofstadter in 1983 in a Scientific
American column. In his own words:
“If reasoning dictates an answer, then everyone should independently
come to that answer. Seeing this fact is itself the critical step in the
reasoning toward the correct answer [...]. Once you realize this fact,
then it dawns on you that either all rational players will choose D or
all rational players will choose C. This is the crux.
Any number of ideal rational thinkers faced with the same situation and
undergoing similar throes of reasoning agony will necessarily come up
with the identical answer eventually, so long as reasoning alone is the
ultimate justification for their conclusion. Otherwise reasoning would
be subjective, not objective as arithmetics is. A conclusion reached by
reasoning would be a matter of preference, not of necessity.”
It appears straightaway that the above consideration directly puts in ques-
tion the fundamental assumption behind Nash equilibria that players consider
their decisions to be independent from other players’ decisions. Superrational
players consider that their reasonings are correlated, not because of any causal
effect or any kind of retrocausality, but because their reasonings and conclu-
sions are identical.
The games described in the column are all symmetric, which is a require-
ment for the reasonings to be identical. Identical reasonings and conclusions
mean that only outcomes on the diagonal of the normal form are considered.
An equilibrium is reached if among all outcomes of the diagonal, it leads to
the highest payoffs (which does not depend on the player as the game is sym-
metric).
Formally, this is expressed as follows.
Definition 4 (Hofstadter equilibrium) Given a symmetric game in nor-
mal form, a strategy profile −→σ is an equilibrium reached by Superrational
players (a Hofstadter equilibrium) if:
– the strategy profile is on the diagonal:
∃υ ∈ Υ,−→σ = (υ, υ, ..., υ)
which we can also express as
−→σ ∈ diag(Σ)
– it maximizes the payoff on the diagonal
∀−→τ ∈ diag(Σ),∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥ ui(−→τ )
Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the Hofstadter equilibria for our example games.
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 8 The prisoner’s dilemma. Superrational players either both cooperate or both deviate.
In a Hofstadter equilibrium, players both cooperate.
Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 9 The chicken game. Superrational players either both stay straight or swerve. In a
Hofstadter equilibrium, players both swerve.
Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 10 The coordination game. Superrational players either both pick Sushi or Pizza. In
a Hofstadter equilibrium, players both pick Pizza.
2.5 CCBR and minimax rationalizability
A classical assumption made in game theory is Common Belief of Rationality:
all players are rational, and believe that they all are, and believe that they all
believe that they all are, and so on. In other words, rationality is profactually
assumed.
A framework in which players consider that their opponents’ strategies
are correlated to theirs, and who want to anticipate their reactions, needs
to extend the assumption of rationality to other possible worlds: belief of
rationality must also be counterfactually assumed, recursively. This line of
thought is common to the work by Hofstadter, Dupuy/Fourny/Reiche, Shiffrin,
Halpern/Pass, etc1. Not only do players believe that they are rational, but they
would also believe so if they switched strategies. This is key to modelling the
reaction of an opponent when considering alternate strategies.
Joseph Halpern and Rafael pass explicitly name—and formally define—
this assumption as Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR):
the beliefs of a player would also hold if this player would play a different
strategy—they call this a counterfactual belief: all players are rational, and
believe that they all are, and each one of them believes that all players would
also be rational if they played otherwise, and so on. Building on this termi-
nology, all players are rational, and counterfactually believe that they all are,
and counterfactually believe that they all counterfactually believe that they
all are, and so on.
1 This is also to be put in relation with the terminology “(common knowledge of) substan-
tive rationality” as discussed between Stalnaker, Aumann, Binmore and Halpern regarding
the Backward Induction Paradox.
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A B C
A 9, 9 8,6 5,1
B 6,8 7,7 4,2
C 1,5 2,4 3,3
⇒
A B C
A 9, 9 8,6 5,1
B 6,8 7,7 4,2
C 1,5 2,4 3,3
⇒
A B C
A 9, 9 8,6 5,1
B 6,8 7,7 4,2
C 1,5 2,4 3,3
Fig. 11 A symmetric 3x3 game in normal form, for which strategy C is minimax-dominated
by both A and B for both players, and (after eliminating C) B is minimax-dominated by A
for both players. The iteration goes from left to right, and eliminated profiles are marked in
gray. C and B are not minimax-rationalizable, in other words, are not rational according to
CCBR, even if each player considers the strategy of the other player not to be fixed
Furthermore, CCBR does not assume that the opponents’ strategies would
be unchanged if a player unilaterally changed his strategy. Dropping this as-
sumption leaves room for the above assumption on the counterfactuals. This
is a bit similar to Stackelberg’s idea, in that a player who changes his strategy
would anticipate in his reasoning how other players would adapt. CCBR is
thus a major change, away from the Nash paradigm.
Halpern and Pass further define minimax rationalizability to select strate-
gies that make sense under CCBR. One way of characterizing minimax ratio-
nalizability is by iterated deletion of strategies that are minimax dominated.
Informally, in a game in normal form, a strategy of player i is minimax
dominated if there exists another strategy that guarantees him a higher payoff
no matter what the opposite player does or would do. In other words, there is
another strategy for which the minimum payoff is greater than the maximum
payoff of the dominated strategy.
The intuition behind this definition is that, even if the player considers that
the opponent’s strategy is correlated with his choice, a minimax-dominated
strategy will never be a good choice as the payoffs will nevertheless always be
less, no matter what the assumed correlation is. If a player P picked a minimax-
dominated strategy, even if the opponent’s strategy is the best possible case
for P, there is another strategy that would give him a higher payoff even if the
(then possibly different) opponent’s strategy were the worst possible case.
This is to be put in contrast with “classical” rationalizability, in which
strategies which are not best responses are eliminated, which is a weaker re-
quirement for elimination. In other words, a strategy that is minimax-dominated
would also be eliminated according to classical rationalizability.
Figure 11 shows an example of game in which some strategies are minimax-
dominated and can thus be eliminated under CCBR. The games shown on
Figures 2, 3 and 4 have no minimax-dominated strategies.
Definition 5 (minimax rationalizability) : Given a game (P,Σ, u), given
a player i, a strategy σi is minimax-dominated
2 if
2 In the original paper (Halpern and Pass, 2013), the opponent’s strategy is taken from
a subset of the opponent’s strategies to account for successive eliminations. We are leaving
out this aspect here for pedagogical reasons. Indeed, one can also mentally update Σ in
place as strategies get eliminated.
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∃υi ∈ Σi, min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υi, τ−i) > max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σi, τ−i)
Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass give alternate characterizations of minimax-
rationalizability, but iterated deletion is the most intuitive one, and the one
that we will use for our proof.
The concept of minimax-rationalizability, defined on strategies, extends
to strategy profiles, i.e., a strategy profile can be considered to be minimax-
rationalizable if all the strategies it is made of are minimax-rationalizable.
2.6 CCBR and individual rationality
Halpern and Pass define another concept under the assumption of CCBR:
individual rationality of strategy profiles. The concept of individual rationality,
unlike that of minimax-rationalizability, is not meant to be standalone, but
rather to be a useful tool in some proofs related to games with translucent
players3. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning because superrationality, as we
will see, also relates to individual rationality.
Informally, a strategy profile is individually rational if it Pareto-dominates
a virtual strategy profile made of all “best worst payoffs”, that is, each player
gets at least what he has the power to guarantee himself by picking the strat-
egy with the highest worst payoff, regardless of what the opponents do. Here
again, one recognizes CCBR, because the opponent’s strategy is not fixed, and
instead, all possibilities are considered.
Definition 6 (individually rational strategy profile) a strategy profile−→σ is individually rational if
∀i ∈ P, ui(−→σ ) ≥ max
τi∈Σi
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(
−→τ )
Minimax-rationalizability and individual rationality, for strategy profiles,
are not subsuming each other in any way: an individually rational strategy
profile may not survive iterated minimax-deletion, and not all strategy profiles
that survive it are individually rational. As Joseph Halpern and Rafael Pass
point out, an individually rational strategy profile will always survive the first
round of minimax elimination, but may get eliminated in the second. The
intuitive reason is that, after a round of elimination, this strategy profile may
“lose” its individual rationality because the elimination of some strategies can
increase the threshold required for individual rationality.
Figures 12 and 13 show the individually rational strategies for the prisoner’s
dilemma and the chicken game. In these examples, some strategy profiles that
are minimax rationalizable (they all are) are not individually rational (DC and
CD are not, as well as Stay Straight-Stay Straight).
3 Offline discussion with Joseph Halpern at the ASIC conference in Interlaken, Switzer-
land, July 2017.
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Defect Cooperate
Defect 1, 1 3, 0
Cooperate 0, 3 2, 2
Fig. 12 The prisoner’s dilemma with individually rational outcomes shown in gray. The
virtual strategy profile with the best worst payoffs (maximins) is (1, 1). It would not be
individually rational to have opposite strategies.
Straight Swerve
Straight 0, 0 3, 1
Swerve 1, 3 2, 2
Fig. 13 The chicken game with individually rational outcomes shown in gray. The virtual
strategy profile with the best worst payoffs (maximins) is (1, 1). It would not be individually
rational for both players to stay straight.
Sushi Pizza
Sushi 1, 1 0,0
Pizza 0,0 2,2
Fig. 14 The coordination game with individually rational outcomes shown in gray The
virtual strategy profile with the best worst payoffs (maximins) is (5, 5). All strategy profiles
are individually rational.
A B C
A 9, 9 8,6 5,1
B 6,8 7,7 4,2
C 1,5 2,4 3,3
Fig. 15 The 3x3 game with individually rational outcomes shown in gray The virtual strat-
egy profile with the best worst payoffs (maximins) is (5, 5). Indeed, strategy A guarantees
for both players a minimum payoff of 5 regardless of what the other does.
Figure 14 shows the coordination game, where minimax rationalizability
and individual rationality coincide (all strategy profiles qualify).
Figure 15 shows the individually rational strategy profiles on the example
we used for minimax rationalizability. Here, it can be seen that the strategy
profiles AB, BA and BB are individually rational, but do not survive two
rounds of minimax elimination.
3 CCBR subsumes superrationality
We now come to the main results of this paper. The theorems are straightfor-
ward to formulate given our introductory explanations.
Theorem 1 Given a symmetric game in normal form, a Hofstadter equilib-
rium is always minimax-rationalizable.
Theorem 2 Given a symmetric game in normal form, a Hofstadter equilib-
rium is always individually rational.
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We now give the proofs of these two theorems.
Proof (Theorem 1)
In minimax rationalizability, the order of elimination is not relevant. Be-
cause of symmetry, if a strategy gets eliminated for a player, then it will be
eliminated for all players. We reorder eliminations in such a way that strate-
gies get eliminated for all players in batches, so that after each elimination,
the game remains symmetric. We can now show that, for a symmetric game,
a Hofstadter equilibrium cannot get minimax-eliminated.
Let −→σ be a Hofstadter equilibrium. We can write it as −→σ = (σ, σ, ..., σ) for
some σ ∈ Υ .
By definition of the maximum:
max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ, τ−i) ≥ ui(σ, σ, ..., σ)
because (σ, ..., σ) is in the set over which the maximum is taken (opponents’
strategies).
Let now i denote a player, and υ ∈ Υ now be any of its strategies.
By definition of a Hofstadter equilibrium, the payoffs are maximal on the
diagonal, so that:
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ ui(υ, υ, ..., υ)
Finally, by definition of the minimum:
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
because (σ, ..., σ) is in the set over which the maximum is taken (opponents’
strategies).
By transitivity, we get:
max
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(σ, τ−i) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
which directly contradicts the existence of a strategy that allows minimax-
domination, and this holds for any player.
There is one more thing to say for the proof to be complete. After an
iteration of deletion of minimax-dominated strategies as described above, a
Hofstadter equilibrium remains a Hofstadter equilibrium. This is because elim-
inating other rows or columns than that of the maximum diagonal payoff does
not affect this maximum diagonal payoff. Hence, a Hofstadter equilibrium will
recursively survive all iterations and, in the end, satisfy minimax rationaliz-
ability. 
Proof (Theorem 2)
Let −→σ be a Hofstadter equilibrium. We can write it as −→σ = (σ, σ, ..., σ) for
some σ ∈ Υ . Let i denote a player.
By definition of a Hofstadter equilibrium, the payoffs are maximal on the
diagonal, so that:
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Fig. 16 A diagram depicting the relationship between minimax rationalizability, individual
rationality, and Superrationality for strategy profiles.
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ)
Furthermore, for any strategy υ,
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
(the minimum payoff on its line can only be smaller than the payoff on the
diagonal).
Combining the above inequalities:
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
ui(υ, υ, ..., υ) ≥ max
υ∈Υ
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(υ, τ−i)
Considering that υ is a mute variable and that Υ = Σi (symmetric game),
ui(σ, σ, ..., σ) ≥ max
τi∈Σi
min
τ−i∈Σ−i
ui(τi, τ−i)
this fulfils the definition of an individually rational outcome. 
Note that both inclusions are strict: there are minimax-rationalizable strat-
egy profiles that are not Hofstadter equilibria (e.g., DC, CD, DD in the pris-
oner’s dilemma), as well as individually rational strategy profiles that are not
Hofstadter equilibria (e.g., Swerve-Stay Straight in the chicken game, which is
not even on the diagonal, or Sushi-Sushi in the coordination game, which is
not optimal).
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4 Conclusion and future work
We have shown that Superrational players also behave in a way that is consis-
tent with Joseph Halpern’s and Rafael Pass’s Common Counterfactual Belief
of Rationality. This shows that Halpern’s and Pass’s work manages to capture
the behavior described by Douglas Hofstadter. This validates the relevance of
his rationalizability criteria for settings that deviate from Nashian game the-
ory by assuming that a switch of strategy would be correlated with a switch
of strategy by the opponents. The inclusions between the three concepts are
depicted on Figure 16.
Further investigations include finding out whether the Perfect Prediction
Equilibrium, as well as Shiffrin’s equilibrium, are also subsumed by CCBR.
Interestingly, it is straightforward to show with a counterexample that the
PPE (with the game converted to its normal form equivalent) is not always
individually rational, because CCBR expressed on the normal form cannot
capture preemption. However, we conjecture that the PPE may qualify as
minimax rationalizable.
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